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1
CIVIL PRACTICE 
Georgia Uniform Civil Forfeiture Procedure Act: Amend Title 9 of 
the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, Relating to Civil Practice, 
so as to Provide a Comprehensive Civil Forfeiture Procedure; 
Provide for a Short Title; Provide for Definitions; Provide for 
Jurisdiction and Venue; Provide for Innocent Owners; Provide for 
Seizure of Property; Provide for Notice and Time Frames for 
Notice to Interested Parties; Provide for Forfeiture Liens; Provide 
for Storage of Property; Provide for Quasi-Judicial Forfeiture, In 
Rem Forfeiture, and In Personam Forfeiture; Provide for 
Temporary Relief and Stays of Criminal Proceedings; Provide for 
Intervention by Certain Parties under Certain Circumstances; 
Provide for Presumptions and the Burden of Proof; Provide for the 
Disposition of Seized Property and Reporting; Provide for the 
Effect of Federal Law Forfeitures; Amend Section 60 of Part 1 of 
Article 4 of Chapter 12 of Title 15 of the Official Code of Georgia 
Annotated, Relating to the Qualifications for Grand Jurors, so as to 
Prohibit Certain Individuals from Serving as Grand Jurors; 
Prohibit Quashing of Indictments when Ineligible Grand Jurors 
Serve on a Grand Jury; Amend Title 16 of the Official Code of 
Georgia Annotated, Relating to Crimes And Offenses, so as to 
Conform Provisions to the New Chapter 16 of Title 9, Correct 
Cross-References, and Remove Obsolete or Improper References to 
Forfeiture; Amend Titles 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 17, 27, 36, 38, 40, 45, 
46, 48, 49, and 52 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, 
Relating to Alcoholic Beverages, Appeal and Error, Banking and 
Finance, Commerce and Trade, Conservation and Natural 
Resources, Courts, Criminal Procedure, Game and Fish, Local 
Government, Military, Emergency Management, and Veterans 
Affairs, Motor Vehicles and Traffic, Public Officers and 
Employees, Public Utilities and Public Transportation, Revenue 
and Taxation, Social Services, and Waters of the State, Ports, and 
Watercraft, Respectively, so as to Conform Provisions to the New 
Chapter 16 of Title 9, Correct Cross-References, and Remove 
Obsolete or Improper References to Forfeiture; Provide for Related 
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Matters; Provide for an Effective Date and Applicability; Repeal 
Conflicting Laws; and for Other Purposes 
CODE SECTIONS:  O.C.G.A. §§ 3-10-10, -11, -12 
(amended); 4-3-8 (amended); 5-5-41 
(amended); 7-1-11, -916 (amended); 
9-16-1, -2,-3, -4, -5, -6, -7, -8, -9, -10, 
-11, -12, -13, -14, -15, -16, -17, -18, 
-19, -20, -21 -22 (new); 10-1-454 
(amended); 10-13A-8 (amended); 
12-4-48 (amended); 12-5-133 
(amended); 12-5-137 (amended); 
12-8-2 (amended); 15-6-95 (amended); 
15-12-60 (amended); 15-21-2, -3, -4, 
-5, -7, -8, -9, -13, -50, -51, -52, -54, 
-55, -56, -57, -58 (amended); 
16-5-44.1, -46 (amended); 16-6-13.2, 
-13.3 (new); 16-7-95 (amended); 
16-8-5.2, -60, -85, -106 (amended); 
16-9-4 (amended); 16-11-11 
(amended); 16-12-24, -30 (amended); 
16-12-32 (new); 16-12-100 (amended); 
16-13-30.1, -30.2, -30.4, -32, -32.1, 
-48.1 (amended); 16-13-49, -53, -58 
(amended); 16-14-1, -2, -3, -4, -5, -6, 
-7, -8, -10, -11, -12, -13, -14, -15 
(amended); 16-15-5 (amended); 
16-16-2 (amended); 17-5-51, -52, 
-52.1, -54 (amended); 24-13-132 
(amended); 27-1-14 (amended); 
27-3-12, -26 (amended); 27-4-133, 
-134, -137 (amended); 36-15-9 
(amended); 36-30-9 (amended); 
36-31-8 (amended); 36-32-6, -7, -8, -9, 
-10, -10.1 (amended); 36-35-6 
(amended); 36-80-21 (amended); 
38-2-464 (amended); 40-5-124 
(amended); 40-6-391.2 (amended); 
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40-11-20 (amended); 40-11-21 (new); 
40-11-22, -24 (amended); 40-13-22 
(amended); 40-16-7 (amended); 
42-9-45 (amended); 45-15-10 
(amended); 46-9-253 (amended); 
48-4-61 (amended); 49-4-146.3 
(amended); 52-7-7.3, -7.4 (amended) 
BILL NUMBER:  HB 233 
ACT NUMBER:  98 
GEORGIA LAWS: 2015 Ga. Laws 693 
SUMMARY: The Act provides a comprehensive 
civil forfeiture procedure. The Act also 
amends sections relating to the 
qualifications for grand jurors, so as to 
prohibit certain individuals from 
serving as grand jurors and to prohibit 
the quashing of indictments when 
ineligible grand jurors serve on a grand 
jury. The Act also amends sections 
relating to crimes, offenses, and 
regulations to conform those Code 
sections with the new civil forfeiture 
legislation. 
EFFECTIVE DATE: July 1, 2015 
History 
Civil asset forfeiture in America predates independence from 
England.1 By 1696, the English Crown had codified its power to 
issue “writs of assistance” allowing customs officials to enter 
colonial homes or vessels and confiscate smuggled goods.2 In a 
February 1691 hearing discussing the legitimacy of writs of 
assistance, Boston merchants characterized writs as “the worst 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Sarah Stillman, Taken, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 12, 2013, at 48, available at 2013 WLNR 
20611866. 
 2. Id.; James M. Farrell, The Child Independence is Born: James Otis and 
Writs of Assistance 6, 11 (2014) (unpublished scholarship, University of New Hampshire: Scholars’ 
Repository), available at http://scholars.unh.edu/comm_facpub/5/. 
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instruments of arbitrary power,” as the writs could issue to any 
revenue or customs officer (or their subordinates) in perpetuity, and 
authorized searches unsupported by any oath attesting to the 
suspected presence of contraband.3 Thus, these writs were “among 
the key grievances that triggered the American Revolution.”4 
Ultimately, following the American Revolution, those opposing the 
writs called for these writs to be abolished through “judicial 
nullification of parliamentary law” because they were contrary to the 
Constitution.5 The Bill of Rights prohibits “unreasonable searches 
and seizures”6 and declares that no one will be deprived of “life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”7 Although the 
deprivation of property without due process runs contrary to the Bill 
of Rights, the United States Supreme Court held that civil asset 
forfeiture was necessary to enforce piracy, customs, and admiralty 
laws, as the vessel owner could be overseas and thus out of reach of 
an in personam action.8 Proceeding in rem—treating “[t]he vessel 
which commits the aggression . . . as the offender”—required “[no] 
reference whatsoever to the character or the conduct of the owner.”9 
In rem procedures are the heart of civil asset forfeiture.10 Unlike 
criminal forfeiture (an in personam action where a person stands trial 
and forfeits property only after conviction), civil forfeiture charges 
the property itself with breaking the law.11 Because civil forfeiture is 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Farrell, supra note 2, at 19–21. 
 4. Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic Agenda, 
65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 75 (1998). 
 5. Farrell, supra note 2, at 22. 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 8. Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. 210, 233 (1844). An in personam action is brought against a 
natural or legal person, rather than against property, and involves determining personal rights and 
obligations. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 36, 912 (10th ed. 2014). 
 9. Harmony, 43 U.S. at 233. An in rem action names real or personal property as defendant, 
determines the status of the property, and adjudicates the rights of persons generally with respect to the 
property. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 36, 913 (10th ed. 2014). 
 10. See Harmony, 43 U.S. at 233; see also Cisco v. State, 285 Ga. 656, 659, 680 S.E.2d 831, 834 
(2009) (citing United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 330 (1998)) (stating that “[t]he United States 
Supreme Court has recognized that civil asset forfeiture, with its biblical roots and common law 
development in medieval England, has for centuries been an in rem proceeding against property, 
operating under the legal fiction that the seized property, and not the property’s owner, is the guilty 
party.”); FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: ASSET FORFEITURE, 
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/white_collar/asset-forfeiture (last visited Sept. 29, 2015). 
 11. Georgia Legislators Must Reform the State’s Civil Forfeiture Laws to Protect Due Process and 
Private Property Rights, INST. FOR JUST., https://www.ij.org/georgia-civil-forfeiture-legislative-
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an in rem procedure against property, the action proceeds without 
regard to the owner’s due process rights.12 For example, property has 
no right to court-appointed counsel; the owner must take on the 
expense of representation, which may outweigh the value of 
recovering forfeited items.13 Further, there is no presumption of 
innocence for the property; the owner must prove valid ownership of 
the assets.14 Finally, in an in personam criminal proceeding, the state 
must prove the person’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before 
depriving him of property; however, in an in rem civil action, the 
state must only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
property is connected to illegal activities.15 
Modern civil asset forfeiture first emerged in the 1970s, when the 
federal government enacted statutes allowing law enforcement to 
seize property from drug lords and crime bosses.16 Congress enlarged 
these laws to enable seizure of money and goods involved in illegal 
drug production, and later expanded them to include anything 
authorities thought drug money was used in purchasing.17 In 1984, 
Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act.18 This Act 
established the “Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund,” 
through which local police, who assisted the federal government in 
seizing assets, could keep a large percentage of the seized assets.19 
After the federal government’s system proved successful, states 
began to follow the federal government’s example by enacting their 
own civil forfeiture laws.20 But while federal agents targeted assets of 
                                                                                                                 
backgrounder-2 (last visited Sept. 29, 2015) [hereinafter Georgia Legislators Must Reform]. 
 12. Id. Proceedings against property are captioned as such: “State of Georgia v. $1,324.00 in U.S. 
Currency or The United States of America v. One 2002 Toyota Sequoia.” Id. 
 13. Benson Varghese, Presumed Guilty Until Proven Innocent: What You Didn’t Know About Asset 
Forfeitures in Texas, VARGHESE SUMMERSETT (Sept. 1, 2014), https://www.versustexas.com/criminal/ 
asset-forfeitures-in-texas/. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See Michael Sallah et al., Stop and Seize, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/06/stop-and-seize/. 
 17. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1994) (authorizing forfeiture of proceeds from drug offenses); 21 
U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1994) (authorizing forfeiture of any property used “to commit, or to facilitate the 
commission of,” a drug offense). 
 18. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976. 
 19. See 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1) (2015). 
 20. Scott Bullock, Policing for Profit, Asset Forfeiture Report: Foreword, INST. FOR JUST., 
http://www.ij.org/foreword-2 (last visited Sept. 29, 2015); see, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.420 
(West, Westlaw through 2015). 
5
et al.: HB 233 – Civil Practice: Georgia Uniform Civil Forfeiture Procedu
Published by Reading Room, 2015
6 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1 
 
white-collar criminals, organized-crime barons, and dictators, state 
forfeiture cases generally dealt with less serious offenders and 
smaller amounts of money.21 For example, in 2011, fifty-eight local, 
county, and state police departments in Georgia netted $2.76 million 
in forfeitures, but over half of the taken items were worth less than 
$650.22 
States also varied widely in the rules they promulgated.23 On the 
federal level, reforms were on the rise,24 while state and local level 
controls on asset seizure procedures, reporting, and spending 
remained loosely implemented.25 Minimal oversight typically means 
police can seize and spend assets, often without reporting the asset’s 
source or disposition.26 Activist groups, like Georgians for Forfeiture 
Reform, have called for legislative changes to improve reporting 
requirements, seeking more transparency and public accountability.27 
However, Georgians are already supposed to have access to statewide 
forfeiture data by virtue of legislation passed in 2010 that required 
each agency to electronically report seizures to the University of 
Georgia’s Carl Vinson Institute for Government website.28 The 
information in this reports database is sparse, however, because a 
lack of clarity in reporting procedures and lack of consequences for 
poor reporting.29 
Pursuant to this 2010 law, law enforcement agencies were required 
to make yearly reports available to the public; however, district 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Stillman, supra note 1. 
 22. Dick M. Carpenter II & Lee McGrath, Rotten Reporting in the Peach State: Civil Forfeiture in 
Georgia Leaves the Public in the Dark, INST. FOR JUST. 2, 7 (Jan. 2013), 
http://ij.org/images/pdf_folder/other_pubs/rotten-reporting.pdf. 
 23. See Jefferson Holcomb, Tombislav Kovandzic & Marian Williams, Civil Asset Forfeiture, 
Equitable Sharing, and Policing for Profit in the United States, 39 J. CRIM. JUST. 273, 273–85 (2011). 
 24. See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), Public Law No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 
202. 
 25. See Stillman, supra note 1. 
 26. See id. 
 27. AFP Set to Launch Georgians for Forfeiture Reform Coalition on Feb 12th, AFP GEORGIA (Feb. 
5, 2014), http://americansforprosperity.org/georgia/article/afp-set-to-launch-georgians-for-forfeiture-
reform-coalition-on-feb-12th/. 
 28. 2010 Ga. Laws 519, § 1, at 520 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-80-21(d)–(f) (2010)). 
 29. See Tyler Jett, Georgia Tightens Rules for Property Forfeiture, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE 
PRESS, Apr. 18, 2015, available at 2015 WLNR 11329142 (reporting that only three of the fifteen law 
enforcement agencies in the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit made the mandatory reports to the 
Institute). 
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attorneys were not.30 District attorneys’ offices could receive up to 
ten percent of the proceeds from forfeitures they were involved in 
and could spend the money on “any and all necessary expenses for 
the operation of the office . . . .”31 As such, the lack of transparency 
and broad spending discretion led to scandals over how forfeited 
assets were used.32 In contrast, when seized funds are placed in a 
neutral account (like a state general operating fund or a public 
education account) states can generally avoid major forfeiture-abuse 
scandals.33 Problems tend to arise in states like Georgia because there 
are so few restrictions on how law enforcement agencies can use 
forfeiture proceeds.34 
Georgia’s civil-forfeiture laws were ranked among the worst in the 
country by the “merry band of libertarian litigators” at the Institute 
for Justice.35 In the Institute for Justice’s 2010 report, Policing for 
Profit, Georgia received a “D–,” the lowest grade given.36 Like 
Georgia, several states around the country are attempting reform with 
varying degrees of success.37 In Maryland and Wyoming, the 
Governors vetoed bills that would have increased accountability for 
law enforcement agencies by increasing their transparency to the 
public.38 Both Governors acknowledged that civil asset forfeiture 
laws are abused in some places but believe their forfeiture programs 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Willoughby Mariano, DA Spent Funds on Galas, Meals, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 9, 2013, at 
A1, available at 2013 WLNR 14150861. 
 31. O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(u)(4)(B) (2011). 
 32. See Mariano, supra note 30. 
 33. Stillman, supra note 1. 
 34. Id. 
 35. About IJ, INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2015); Marian Williams, Jefferson 
Holcomb, & Tomislav Kovandzic, Policing for Profit: Asset Forfeiture Report: Part I, INST. FOR JUST. 
(Mar. 2010), http://www.ij.org/part-i-policing-for-profit-2. 
 36. Policing for Profit: Asset Forfeiture Report: Grade Detail, INST. FOR JUST. (Mar. 2010), 
http://www.ij.org/asset-forfeiture-report-grade-detail. Georgia tied for last place with Michigan, Texas, 
Virginia, and West Virginia. Id. 
 37. See generally Jacob Gershman, Legislation to Curb Civil Forfeiture Advances in States, WALL 
ST. J. L. BLOG (Mar. 25, 2015, 11:48 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2015/03/25/legislation-to-curb-
civil-forfeiture-advances-in-states/. 
 38. Scott Shackford, Maryland Governor Vetoes Asset Forfeiture Reform, Marijuana 
Decriminalization Bills, REASON.COM HIT & RUN BLOG (May 22, 2015, 5:45 PM), 
http://reason.com/blog/2015/05/22/maryland-governor-vetoes-asset-forfeitur; Ben Neary, Gov. Mead 
Vetoes Asset Forfeiture Bill, CASPER STAR TRIB. (Feb. 17, 2015 7:05 PM), http://trib.com/news/state-
and-regional/govt-and-politics/gov-mead-vetoes-asset-forfeiture-bill/article_f1f2f2f2-4d18-5240-b947-
3fc34edb3319.html. 
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ensure that criminals do not keep their profits.39 Other states, like 
New Mexico and Montana, have passed sweeping reforms.40 
Montana now requires police to convict a property owner before 
permanent forfeiture is permissible.41 New Mexico abolished civil 
asset forfeiture altogether.42 
Georgia Representatives attempted to abolish civil forfeiture, 
similar to New Mexico, during the 2011–2012 legislative session, but 
the bill died in the House.43 Representative Wendell Willard (R-
51st), introduced a more moderate civil forfeiture proposal during the 
2013–2014 session, which would have elevated the level of proof 
required to seize property from a “preponderance of evidence” 
standard to “clear and convincing evidence”44 and would have 
reduced the estimated value of seized property that merits automatic 
judicial review from $25,000 to $5,000.45 Putnam County Sheriff and 
leader of the Georgia Sheriff’s Association, Howard Sills, strongly 
opposed the bill.46 “‘That bill would have only benefited, in my 
personal and professional opinion, criminals and the lawyers who 
represent them,’ he said.”47 Facing the bill’s likely defeat, 
Representative Willard decided to postpone the vote.48 
Representative Willard reintroduced a modified bill in 2014, 
retaining the preponderance of the evidence standard and a $25,000 
automatic review level.49 Along with these concessions to law 
enforcement officials, the bill contained procedural protections for 
                                                                                                                 
 39. See Shackford, supra note 38; Neary, supra note 38. 
 40. Casey Harper, BREAKING: New Mexico Gov Abolishes Civil Asset Forfeiture, DAILY CALLER 
NEWS FOUND. (Apr. 10, 2015, 2:18 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2015/04/10/breaking-new-mexico-gov-
abolishes-civil-asset-forfeiture-bill/; Nick Wing, Montana Governor Signs Law To Protect Innocent 
People From Having Their Property Seized By Police, HUFF POST POLITICS (May 6, 2015, 2:37 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/06/montana-civil-asset-forfeiture_n_7222258.html. 
 41. Wing, supra note 40. 
 42. Harper, supra note 40. 
 43. House Bill (HB) 36, as introduced, 2011 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 44. HB 1 (LC 29 5600S), § 1-1, p. 15, ln. 512–13, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 45. Id. § 1-1, p. 8, ln. 253. 
 46. Ray Henry, In Ga., a Push to Change Civil Forfeiture Laws, ATHENS BANNER-HERALD, June 
15, 2013, available at http://onlineathens.com/local-news/2013-06-15/ga-push-change-civil-forfeiture-
laws. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Mike Klein, Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Gets a Facelift, GA. PUB. POL’Y FOUND.                   
(Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.georgiapolicy.org/2014/01/civil-asset-forfeiture-reform-undergoes 
-a-legislative-facelift/. 
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innocent owners and established a penalty for an agency’s failure to 
file the required reports—exclusion from collecting civil forfeiture 
funds until they are in compliance.50 In spite of these concessions, the 
Georgia Sherriff’s Association remained opposed and again brought 
the bill down.51 
Increased attention on spending scandals and procedural problems 
has helped the push for civil forfeiture reform. “We certainly had at 
least a perception that our laws . . . created a profit incentive,” said 
Representative Alex Atwood (R-179th), a sponsor of HB 233, which 
was introduced in the 2015–2016 Regular Legislative Session.52 “If 
you have citizens whose goods are being taken inappropriately, or an 
innocent person being deprived of what they legitimately earned, and 
not getting that returned to them in a timely manner, that troubles 
me.”53 As a former federal agent, Representative Atwood 
successfully bridged the gap between the lawmakers and the law 
enforcement groups that opposed prior attempts at civil asset 
forfeiture reform.54 “I’m one of the ones the guys [they] would call 
out at night to come get property, drug dealers, and everything else. 
So I was not insensitive to what law enforcement [] needed to do.”55 
Bill Tracking of HB 233 
Consideration and Passage by the House 
Representatives Alex Atwood (R-179th), Mike Dudgeon (R-25th), 
Harry Geisinger (R-48th), Emory Dunahoo (R-30th), and Rick 
Jasperse (R-11th) sponsored HB 233.56 The House read the bill for 
the first time on February 9, 2015.57 The House read the bill for the 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id. 
 51. Jason Snead & Andrew Kloster, Georgia Fails to Pass Civil Forfeiture Reform, THE DAILY 
SIGNAL (Mar. 12, 2014), http://dailysignal.com/2014/03/12/georgia-fails-pass-civil-forfeiture-reform/. 
 52. Georgia General Assembly, HB 233, Bill Tracking, http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-
US/Display/20152016/HB/233; Gershman, supra note 37. 
 53. Telephone Interview with Rep. Alex Atwood (R-179th) (June 26, 2015). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Georgia General Assembly, HB 233, Bill Tracking, http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-
US/Display/20152016/HB/233. 
 57. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 233, May 14, 2015. 
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second time on February 10, 2015.58 Speaker David Ralston (R-7th) 
assigned the bill to the House Judiciary Committee, which favorably 
reported it by substitute on February 25, 2015.59 The House read the 
bill for the third time, and passed and adopted it by substitute on 
March 2, 2015.60 The substitute removed reference to other repealed 
Code sections.61 The House passed HB 233 by a vote of 154 to 0..62 
Consideration and Passage by the Senate 
Senator Jesse Stone (R-23rd) sponsored HB 233 in the Senate.63 
The bill was first read on March 3, 2015, and was assigned to the 
Senate Judiciary Non-Civil Committee.64 The Senate Committee 
favorably reported the bill on March 19, 2015.65 The bill was read the 
second time on March 20, 2015, and for the third time on March 31, 
2015.66 Senators Stone and Harold Jones II (D-22nd) offered a floor 
amendment that prohibits certain individuals from serving as grand 
jurors and prohibits quashing indictments if it is later determined that 
an ineligible grand juror was serving at the time of the return of the 
indictment.67 On March 31, 2015, the Senate passed HB 233 by a 
vote of 47 to 0.68 On April 2, 2015, the House agreed to the Senate 
amendment by a vote of 170 to 0.69 HB 233 was sent to Governor 
Nathan Deal (R) on April 14, 2015, and he signed it into law on May 
6, 2015.70 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See generally HB 233 (HCS), 2015 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 62. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, HB 233 (Mar. 2, 2015). 
 63. Georgia General Assembly, HB 233, Bill Tracking, http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-
US/Display/20152016/HB/233. 
 64. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 233, May 14, 2015. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. HB 233 (SFA), § 1A-1, p. 28–29, ln. 980–1000, 2015 Ga. Gen. Assem. This version of the bill, 
the House Committee substitute as amended by the Senate, represents the final version of the bill that 
was passed into law. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 233, May 14, 2015. 
 68. Georgia Senate Voting Record, HB 233 (Mar. 31, 2015). 
 69. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, HB 233 (Apr. 2, 2015). 
 70. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 233, May 14, 2015. 
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The Act 
The Act is entitled the “Georgia Uniform Civil Forfeiture 
Procedure Act”71 and amends Title 9 of the Official Code of Georgia 
Annotated as it relates to civil forfeiture in order to provide a more 
comprehensive civil forfeiture process.72 Further, the Act amends 
Code section 15-12-60, as it relates to the qualifications for grand 
jurors.73 The Act also amends Title 16 of the Code relating to crimes 
and offenses.74 Finally, the Act amends Titles 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 17, 
27, 36, 38, 40, 45, 46, 48, 49, and 52 of the Code to align Code 
sections with the provisions set forth in the Act.75 
Part I 
Part I of the Act is entitled “Civil Forfeiture Procedure.”76 Section 
1-1 amends Title 9 of the Official Code to add Chapter 16.77 The 
Georgia Code now includes the following sections: section 9-16-1 
which gives the title for the new chapter;78 section 9-16-2 contains 
definitions for the terms in the new chapter.79 Section 9-16-3 dictates 
the jurisdiction’s parameters for a civil forfeiture proceeding, stating 
that for an in rem action, the proceeding may be brought in the 
“judicial circuit where the property is located,” and for an in 
personam action, the proceeding may be brought “in the judicial 
circuit in which the defendant resides.”80 Code section 9-16-3(a)(3) 
states that a civil forfeiture proceeding may be brought by “the state 
attorney having jurisdiction over any offense which arose out of the 
same conduct which made the property subject to forfeiture.”81 Code 
section 9-16-4 states that a complaint for forfeiture shall be tried in 
the county where the property is located if the proceeding is in rem, 
                                                                                                                 
 71. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-1 (2015). 
 72. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-1 et. seq. (2015); 2015 Ga. Laws 693, at 693–94. 
 73. 2015 Ga. Laws 693, at 694. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. 2015 Ga. Laws 693, § 1-1, at 694. 
 77. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-1 et. seq. (2015). 
 78. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-1 (2015). 
 79. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-2 (2015). 
 80. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-3 (2015). 
 81. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-3(a)(3) (2015). 
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and as provided in “Article VI, Section II of the Constitution” if the 
proceeding is in personam.82 
Code section 9-16-5 states that if a vehicle registered to a person 
who is not present at the “scene of the seizure” is to be seized, the 
seizing officer must make a reasonable effort to find the owner and 
inform them of the seizure.83 Code section 9-16-6 states that an 
officer may seize property if done either through a validly executed 
search warrant, or if there is probable cause to believe that the 
property is subject to forfeiture.84 Further, subsection (c) states that 
the court’s jurisdiction will not be altered, even if the seizure was 
made in violation of the Georgia Constitution or United States 
Constitution, if the seizure was made with “process or in a good faith 
belief of probable cause.”85 Code section 9-16-7 contains three 
subsections.86 Subsection (a) states that when an officer seizes 
property, the seizing officer must, in writing and within thirty days of 
the seizure, conduct an inventory of the property and provide it to the 
district attorney in the county with jurisdiction over the proceeding.87 
Subsection (b) states that, within sixty days from the date of seizure, 
the state attorney shall either initiate a “quasi-judicial” forfeiture88 or 
“file a complaint for forfeiture.”89 Subsection (c) states that if a state 
attorney fails to comply with this subsection, then the seized property 
must be returned to the owner upon request.90 
Code section 9-16-8 dictates the requirements for a forfeiture 
lien.91 The lien will constitute notice to persons claiming an interest 
in the property.92 The lien must contain the name of each person with 
“a known interest in the seized property,”93 and a description of the 
property.94 If judgment is entered in favor of the State, then the State 
                                                                                                                 
 82. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-4 (2015). 
 83. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-5 (2015). 
 84. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-6 (2015). 
 85. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-6(c) (2015). 
 86. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-7 (2015). 
 87. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-7(a) (2015). 
 88. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-7(b)(1) (2015). 
 89. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-7(b)(2) (2015). 
 90. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-7(c) (2015). 
 91. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-8 (2015). 
 92. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-8(a) (2015). 
 93. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-8(a)(1) (2015). 
 94. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-8(a)(2) (2015). 
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may execute the forfeiture lien just like any judgment.95 Lastly, a 
trustee who receives notice of a forfeiture lien shall furnish, within 
ten days, the names and addresses of the legal and beneficial property 
owners,96 and a copy of the trust agreement.97 If a trustee fails to do 
this, he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor.98 
Code section 9-16-9 dictates that property seized under this 
chapter shall not be subject to replevin.99 Code section 9-16-10 
dictates what a state attorney may do with seized property.100 
Specifically, a state attorney may do one of the following: remove the 
property to “a place designated by the superior court”;101 place the 
property under “constructive seizure” by posting notice at the 
applicable courthouse;102 remove the property to a storage area;103 
have another governmental agency take custody of the property;104 or 
require the sheriff to take custody of the property.105 Upon motion, 
the court may order the property sold if its value is depreciating or if 
it is perishable..106 If the property is currency, and not needed for 
evidentiary purposes, then, within sixty days of seizure, the currency 
shall be deposited into a separate, interest-bearing account at a 
financial institution within the applicable county.107 If the property is 
a negotiable instrument, then, within sixty days of seizure, it shall be 
secured in a financial institution in the applicable county.108 All 
interest gained on these accounts shall be paid to the County Drug 
Abuse Treatment and Education Fund.109 
Code section 9-16-11 dictates the procedure for posting and 
serving a notice of forfeiture.110 If the estimated value of the property 
                                                                                                                 
 95. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-8(d) (2015). 
 96. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-8(e)(1)–(2) (2015). 
 97. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-8(e)(3) (2015). 
 98. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-8(f) (2015). 
 99. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-9(a) (2015). 
 100. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-10 (2015). 
 101. O.C.G.A.§ 9-16-10(a)(1) (2015). 
 102. O.C.G.A.§ 9-16-10(a)(2) (2015). 
 103. O.C.G.A.§ 9-16-10(a)(3) (2015). 
 104. O.C.G.A.§ 9-16-10(a)(4) (2015). 
 105. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-10(a)(5) (2015). 
 106. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-10(b)(1) (2015). 
 107. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-10(c)(1) (2015). 
 108. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-10(c)(2) (2015). 
 109. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-10(c)(3) (2015). 
 110. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-11 (2015). 
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is less than $25,000, then a state attorney must post notice at the 
applicable county courthouse.111 The notice must provide a 
description of the property,112 the date and place of seizure,113 the 
conduct giving rise to the seizure,114 the alleged violation of law,115 
and a statement that the owner has thirty days to make a claim on the 
property.116 Such claims must include the name of the claimant, the 
claimant’s address, a description of the claimant’s interest in the 
property, and any documentation that supports the claim.117 The state 
attorney must serve this notice upon an owner if the owner is known, 
or, if the owner is unknown, publish the notice for two weeks in the 
county’s “legal organ.”118 If any claim is served, then the state 
attorney must file a complaint for forfeiture within thirty days of 
receiving the claim.119 Any property not claimed either within thirty 
days of service of notice or the second publication is forfeited.120 
Code section 9-16-12 describes the procedure for actions in rem.121 
For an action in rem, the property itself is named as the defendant in 
the complaint.122 A copy of the complaint and summons must be 
served on any person known to have any interest in the property.123 If 
a real-property interest holder is unknown, then notice must be 
published in the legal organ of the county for two weeks.124 The 
county sheriff, by court order, may seize tangible property.125 A 
person with an ownership interest in the property may file an answer 
to the complaint within thirty days of service of the summons and 
complaint.126 Once an answer is filed, a bench trial will be held 
                                                                                                                 
 111. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-11(a) (2015). 
 112. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-11(a)(1) (2015). 
 113. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-11(a)(2) (2015). 
 114. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-11(a)(3) (2015). 
 115. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-11(a)(4) (2015). 
 116. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-11(a)(5) (2015). 
 117. Id. 
 118. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-11(b) (2015). 
 119. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-11(c)(1) (2015). 
 120. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-11(c)(4) (2015). 
 121. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-12 (2015). 
 122. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-12(a) (2015). 
 123. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-12(b)(1) (2015). 
 124. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-12(b)(3) (2015). 
 125. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-12(b)(4) (2015). 
 126. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-12(c)(1) (2015). 
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within sixty days.127 If no answer is filed, the state attorney may seek 
a default judgment.128 
Code section 9-16-13 describes the procedure for actions in 
personam.129 The complaint must provide, among other 
requirements, a description of the property, the reasons it was seized, 
and conclude with a prayer for execution of the forfeiture.130 The 
complaint must be served upon the named party, or if the party is 
unknown, then published in the legal organ of the county for two 
consecutive weeks.131 An answer must be filed within thirty days of 
service or within thirty days of the last date of publication; a bench 
trial will be held within sixty days of the filing of the answer.132 
Code section 9-16-14 describes the interim procedures that a court 
may take to preserve property during the forfeiture proceedings.133 
Specifically, the court may issue a restraining order or injunction if 
the state attorney believes that there is probable cause that the 
property will be subject to forfeiture.134 Further, the court may order 
the property be sold to satisfy any specified interest of any interested 
party upon motion and hearing.135 
Code section 9-16-15 states that the court may stay a civil 
forfeiture proceeding during “the pendency of criminal 
proceedings.”136 An acquittal or dismissal, however, does not 
preclude civil forfeiture.137 A defendant who is convicted of the 
criminal offense cannot later deny the essential allegations of the 
criminal offense.138 Code section 9-16-16 gives the definition for an 
“injured person” and gives them the right to intervene in the civil 
forfeiture proceeding to claim the forfeited property.139 
Code section 9-16-17 details the state’s burden of proof in civil 
forfeiture proceedings, and the circumstances in which a person’s 
                                                                                                                 
 127. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-12(f) (2015). 
 128. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-12(e) (2015). 
 129. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-13 (2015). 
 130. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-13(a) (2015). 
 131. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-13(b) (2015). 
 132. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-13(c), (f) (2015). 
 133. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-14 (2015). 
 134. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-14(1) (2015). 
 135. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-14(5) (2015). 
 136. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-15(a) (2015). 
 137. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-15(b) (2015). 
 138. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-15(c) (2015). 
 139. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-16(a)–(b) (2015). 
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property interest is not subject to forfeiture.140 The state must show 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is subject to 
forfeiture.141 Property is not subject to forfeiture if, among others, the 
property owner did not know of or participate in the criminal activity 
in question, did not stand to benefit from the criminal conduct, or did 
not hold the property for someone whose conduct gave rise to the 
forfeiture.142 Further, Code section 9-16-18 provides that the state’s 
interest attaches to the property at the time of the conduct that gave 
rise to the forfeiture, and if the property is transferred to another 
person subsequently, the state may seize it.143 
Code section 9-16-19 describes the procedures for the destruction 
or sale of forfeited property.144 Any property that is to be destroyed 
or is harmful to the public shall be forwarded to the Division of 
Forensic Sciences of the Georgia Bureau of Investigations for 
destruction or scientific use.145 When real property is forfeited, the 
title is put into the name of the state and may be disposed of in any 
“commercially reasonable manner.”146 Funds from the sale of 
property shall be used first to pay court costs to the party incurring 
such costs.147 Next, 10% is paid to the district attorney’s office for its 
effort in completing the forfeiture proceedings.148 Next, the law 
enforcement agencies and multijurisdictional task forces will receive 
pro rata shares for their roles in seizing the property.149 The next step 
is a distribution for the representation or treatment of indigent 
defendants, if applicable.150 If there are funds left, then they will be 
distributed to the agency that assisted in the criminal prosecution.151 
                                                                                                                 
 140. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-17(a)(1) (2015). 
 141. Id. 
 142. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-17(a)(2) (2015). 
 143. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-18(a) (2015). 
 144. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-19(b)–(c) (2015). 
 145. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-19(b) (2015). 
 146. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-19(d)(5) (2015). 
 147. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-19(f)(3)(A) (2015). 
 148. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-19(f)(3)(B) (2015). 
 149. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-19(f)(3)(C) (2015). 
 150. See O.C.G.A. § 9-16-19(f)(3)(D) (2015). “If there remains currency in the pool . . . it may be 
distributed as further set forth in division (4)(A)(iii) or (4)(B)(ii) of this subsection, as applicable.” Id. 
These subsections address representation of indigent defendants, treatment for the purpose of deterring 
further criminal behavior, and contribution to Georgia’s victim assistance. O.C.G.A. 
§ 9-16-19(f)(4)(A)(iii) (2015); O.C.G.A. § 9-16-19(f)(4)(B)(ii) (2015). 
 151. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-19(f)(3)(E) (2015). 
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The remainder of this section dictates the reporting requirements 
for each type of agency receiving funds from the forfeited property 
pool.152 Code section 9-16-20 states that a court may order the 
forfeiture of property of a defendant up to the value of the forfeited 
property if the forfeited property cannot be found or has been 
transferred or comingled with other property.153 Further, no one with 
a claim in interest in the property may commence a suit outside of the 
provisions within this chapter.154 Lastly, a civil forfeiture proceeding 
must be commenced within four years of the last action giving rise to 
the forfeiture.155 
Code section 9-16-21 states that seized property may be used by 
state law enforcement agencies as authorized by federal law or 
regulations.156 If federal law or regulations are silent, then the 
property will be disposed of as detailed in Code section 9-16-19.157 
Part I-A 
Part I-A, Section 1A-1 amends Code section 15-12-60 relating to 
the qualifications of grand jurors.158 Specifically, this Code section 
amends subsection (c), and adds a new subsection (d).159 Subsection 
(c) changes the word “person” to “individual” and adds provisions 
for when certain individuals should be excluded from grand jury 
service.160 Specifically, any of the following disqualify an individual 
as a grand juror: felony conviction in state or federal court whose 
civil rights have not been restored,161 judicial determination of mental 
incompetence,162 a felony offense and enrollment in a pre-trial 
release program,163 an uncompleted felony sentence,164 anyone 
                                                                                                                 
 152. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-19(f)(4)–(g)(7) (2015). 
 153. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-20(a) (2015). 
 154. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-20(d) (2015). 
 155. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-20(e) (2015). 
 156. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-21(a) (2015). 
 157. Id. 
 158. 2015 Ga. Laws 693, § 1A-1, at 718. 
 159. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-60(c)–(d) (2015). 
 160. Compare O.C.G.A. § 15-12-60 (2014), with O.C.G.A. § 15-12-60(c) (2015). 
 161. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-60(c)(1) (2015). 
 162. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-60(c)(2) (2015). 
 163. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-60(c)(3) (2015). 
 164. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-60(c)(4) (2015). 
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serving a sentence for a felony offense,165 or participation in a drug 
court division or similar division for a felony offense.166 If after 
beginning service as a grand juror, he or she is found to be ineligibly 
serving, any indictments generated during that service are not 
automatically void.167 
Part II 
Part II of the Act amends Title 16 of the Official Code of Georgia 
Annotated to conform it to the new civil forfeiture procedures.168 In 
Sections 2-1 through 2-27 of the Act, any mention of previous 
forfeiture procedures in Title 16 were removed and replaced with 
language that dictates that any property subject to the forfeiture under 
these sections is contraband, and must be forfeited in accordance 
with the procedures in Chapter 16 of Title 9.169 Further, verbiage is 
changed to make clear that the words “proceeds” and “property” are 
to be treated the same under these provisions.170 
Part III 
Part III of the Act amends Titles 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 17, 27, 36, 38, 
40, 45, 46, 48, 49, and 52 to incorporate correct terminology.171 
Specifically, any conflicting language is removed, and replaced with 
verbiage that states that all forfeiture procedures must conform with 
Chapter 16 of Title 9.172 
                                                                                                                 
 165. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-60(c)(5) (2015). 
 166. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-60(c)(6) (2015). 
 167. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-60(d) (2015). 
 168. See, e.g., 2015 Ga. Laws 693, § 2-1, at 719. 
 169. See 2015 Ga. Laws 693, §§ 2-1 to 2-27, at 719–36. 
 170. Id. 
 171. 2015 Ga. Laws 693, at 736. 
 172. See 2015 Ga. Laws 693, §§ 3-1 to 3-19, at 736–46. 
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Analysis 
Intended Consequences of the Act 
On both the state and federal levels, civil forfeiture reform is an 
area of national concern that has been the subject of debate for 
years.173 The intended consequences of the Act are to reign in 
forfeiture procedures that allowed funds to be used to pay for things 
like “tickets to black-tie galas, sporting events and office parties.”174 
Further, Scott Key, Legislative Chair of the Georgia Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, noted the process in which assets were 
forfeited was “tragic” as a “person loses before he knows what hit 
him because he either didn’t file an answer or failed to follow some 
arcane technical procedure from within the forfeiture code.”175 But 
now, with the addition of the Code sections the Act promulgates, 
civil asset forfeiture is likely to be “less corrupt.”176 
There are several key sections of the Act that curb different types 
of corruption.177 First, in Code section 9-16-5, when a car is seized, 
“the seizing officer . . . shall make a reasonable effort to determine 
the name of the registered owner . . . .”178 Mr. Key noted that he has 
“seen many moms and dads lose vehicles without ever getting served 
or otherwise getting notice of a pending forfeiture.”179 
Further, Code section 9-16-12(c)(2) provides new procedures for 
amending a deficient answer to the forfeiture complaint.180 
Specifically, the state attorney may file for a motion for a more 
definite statement that must point out the deficiencies in the 
                                                                                                                 
 173. See Radley Balko, How Much Civil Asset Forfeiture Will Holder’s New Policy Actually 
Prevent?, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
watch/wp/2015/01/20/how-much-civil-asset-forfeiture-will-holders-new-policy-actually-prevent/. 
 174. Gershman, supra note 37; see Telephone Interview with Chuck Spahos, Exec. Dir., Prosecuting 
Attorneys’ Council of Ga. (July 20, 2015) [hereinafter Spahos Interview] (noting that one of the 
important provision in the Act was to create transparency). 
 175. Scott Key, My Take on Georgia’s Forfeiture Legislation, GA. CRIM. APP. L. BLOG (Feb. 16, 
2015), http://www.georgiacriminalappellatelawblog.com/legislation/my-take-on-georgias-forfeiture-
legislation/. 
 176. Id. (“Under the new statute, the stealing is going to get a bit more fair and possibly much less 
corrupt.”). 
 177. See id. 
 178. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-5 (2015). 
 179. See Key, supra note 175. 
 180. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-12(c)(2) (2015). 
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complaint.181 Commentators note that this may be the “best 
improvement of all.”182 Next, Code section 9-16-19(g)(2) provides a 
mechanism for annual reporting, and makes the forfeiture fund “less 
of a slush fund.”183 Specifically, the annual report must “clearly 
identify the use of such property, proceeds, and income” and be 
“appropriately completed and legible.”184 
Lastly, Code section 9-16-19(f)(4)(A)(ii) makes it illegal to use 
funds “to pay salaries or rewards to law enforcement personnel.”185 
This particular section is of great importance because of a scandal 
involving former Douglas County District Attorney, David McDade, 
and his misappropriation of forfeiture funds.186 Mr. McDade used 
forfeiture funds to pay for an SUV for his office manager, a $90,000 
paid internship to his daughter to transcribe interviews, and trips to 
conferences around the country.187 After an investigation by the 
Georgia Bureau of Investigations, Mr. McDade was not prosecuted 
and only paid back $4,000 to the county.188 The ACLU of Georgia 
also noted that the changes to forfeiture procedures, distribution of 
funds, and reporting safeguards are all positive features of the Act.189 
The Act also intends to fix procedural problems that Georgia faced 
with civil forfeiture because many statutes had different forfeiture 
procedures and some had none at all.190 Chuck Spahos, Executive 
Director of the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council of Georgia, noted that 
the Act is “a much improved process for Georgia” and while the 
actual effect of the law is still yet to be seen, many interested parties 
are optimistic.191 
                                                                                                                 
 181. Id. 
 182. See Key, supra note 175. 
 183. Key, supra note 175 (internal quotation marks omitted); O.C.G.A. § 9-16-19(g)(2) (2015). 
 184. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-19(g)(2) (2015). 
 185. O.C.G.A. § 9-16-19(f)(4)(A)(ii) (2015). 
 186. See Key, supra note 175 (referring to this Code section as the “David McDade Memorial 
Passage”); see also Radley Balko, Good Riddance, Mr. McDade, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/04/04/good-riddance-mr-mcdade/. 
 187. Balko, supra note 186. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Marvin Lim, 2015 Legislative Agenda, AM. C.L. UNION OF GA. (Jan. 2015), 
http://www.acluga.org/files/9514/2453/6634/ACLU-GA_Legislative_Agenda_-_2-20-2015.pdf 
[hereinafter ACLU Legislative Agenda] (highlighting the 2015 legislative agenda in Georgia). 
 190. See Spahos Interview, supra note 174. 
 191. Id. 
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Unresolved Issues 
While the Act fixes several of the aforementioned issues, there are 
still areas that have not been remedied by this legislation. The ACLU 
of Georgia notes several drawbacks of the Act.192 First, the state’s 
burden of proof is still only a preponderance of the evidence.193 This 
low burden still leaves the potential to take an innocent person’s 
property. Second, the cap for the amount that can be taken by a 
particular participating law enforcement agency is still very high, and 
“there is no restriction on [how] forfeiture assets can be spent.”194 
While some of this is true, as noted above, there are now new 
restrictions on spending that would help prevent another David 
McDade-type problem.195 Third, as noted by Scott Key, there is not 
enough of a disincentive for the “outright theft of private 
property.”196 Mr. Key suggests that the “system would be less corrupt 
if the seized assets could all go to a centralized statewide pool of 
funds . . . . As long as the seizing agency has the first claim on the 
property, there’s an incentive for corruption.”197 Considering the 
corruption that has occurred in Georgia because of illegal spending of 
forfeited funds, Mr. Key’s suggestion is not a bad one; but even he 
notes that the “sheriff’s and police chief’s lobby is too powerful to do 
anything about this.”198 
Ryan Behndleman & Lisa Churvis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 192. See ACLU Legislative Agenda, supra note 189. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id.. But see O.C.G.A. § 9-16-19(f)(4)(A)(ii) (2015). 
 195. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 9-16-19(f)(4)(A)(ii) (2015). 
 196. Key, supra note 175. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
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